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In recent decades, international trade in agricultural and
food products has experienced an important shift from being
regulated by traditional market access barriers, such as tariffs
and quotas, toward being governed by a variety of public and
private standards related to product characteristics and pro-
duction, processing, and distribution procedures (Hoekman
& Nicita, 2011). Public standards are set by public authorities,
and usually deal with food quality and safety issues. They are
mostly mandatory, controlled through official inspections and
enforced by law. Private standards are set by private compa-
nies and non-state actors, and often deal with ethical and envi-
ronmental concerns in addition to food quality and safety
issues. They are de jure voluntary—but are sometimes argued
to be de facto mandatory if a large share of buyers requires
compliance—controlled through private audits and enforced
through third-party certification (Henson & Humphrey, 2010).
The increased use of standards has implications for food
trade but it is unclear whether food standards stimulate or
impede trade. This question is specifically important when
developing countries’ food exports are concerned. First, buy-
ers in high-income markets might be more inclined to require
compliance with private standards when sourcing from devel-
oping countries. Asymmetric information problems are more
severe in trade relations between industrialized and developing
countries than in trade between similar regions (with similar
norms about food safety and quality), which may cause pri-
vate standards to be more important for developing countries’
exports (Jaffee & Henson, 2004).
Second, agricultural and food exports are a fundamental
component of developing countries’ growth and entail the
potential to reduce rural poverty. This makes the current
debate on whether food standards act as non-tariff barriers
to trade or as catalysts to trade for developing countries par-
ticularly important (Jaffee & Henson, 2004; Maertens &
Swinnen, 2007). On the one hand, compliance with standards
requires one-time investments, e.g., to update facilities, and
recurrent fixed costs, e.g., for certification procedures
(Maskus, Otsuki, & Wilson, 2013). For exporters and farmers
in developing countries, these costs may be high relative to208their operational size and financial means. Also the lack of
government investments in food safety capacity in developing
countries and the wide divergence between implicit norms on
food quality and safety in these countries and standards in
export markets may result in high compliance costs for farm-
ers and exporters. By increasing the cost of trade, standards
may act as barriers to trade and especially limit exports from
developing countries. On the other hand, standards can solve
information asymmetries between trading partners and reduce
transaction costs, and act as catalysts to trade (Hudson &
Jones, 2003; Jaffee & Masakure, 2005).
In a review on how food standards affect developing coun-
tries’ exports, Honda, Otsuki, and Wilson (in press, Ch. 7)
indicate that, while there is an increasing number of empirical
studies on this issue from varying sectors and countries and
using varying methods, the evidence is very mixed and there
is a need for more empirical evidence to come to more general
conclusions.
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate with a
case-study on how certification to different types of private
standards affects the export performance of asparagus compa-
nies in Peru. Peru is the largest exporter of fresh asparagus
worldwide and its history in asparagus exports dates back to
the 1980s. The sector accounts for 25% of total agro-food
exports and yearly involves around 100 export companies.
From the early 2000s private standards started to spread in
the sector and by 2011 about half of the export companies
are certified to one or several schemes. The large size of the
sector, with a large number of companies involved, and theons of the paper. Final revision accepted: August 29, 2014.
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to analyze the impact of certification to private standards on
firms’ export performance. We analyze firms’ propensity to
export, as well as their export volumes and values, thereby dis-
tinguishing between effects at the extensive and intensive mar-
gin. We take into account the heterogeneity of private
standards by analyzing the effect of standards in general and
of particular individual standards. We use customs data on
exports during 1993–2011, combined with tax administration
data and data from an own firm survey. We use OLS, fixed
effects and system GMM models to estimate effects and con-
trol for export persistence, reverse causality and time-constant
unobserved heterogeneity.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we frame our
research in the existing empirical literature, we explain the
mechanisms through which standards might affect export per-
formance, and further elucidate the contribution this paper
makes in the literature. In Section 3 we describe our database,
the Peruvian asparagus export sector and heterogeneity across
export firms. In Section 4 we present the econometric strategy
to estimate the impact of certification to private standards on
firms’ export performance. In Section 5, we discuss the results
and in Section 6, we conclude with policy and research
implications.2. PRIVATE STANDARDS AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES’ FOOD EXPORTS
There is a growing body of empirical literature that analyzes
the relationship between standards, both public and private,
and trade flows at the import and export level, and feeds the
debate on “standards-as-barriers” and “standards-as-
catalysts”. The largest part of the evidence comes from
macro-economic trade models, usually gravity models, that
estimate the impact of increasing standards, usually public
standards, on international trade flows. This literature gener-
ally points to a trade enhancing impact of standards, even if
overall results remain ambiguous. Some authors find that
standards are a significant source of trade restrictiveness for
middle- and low-income countries (e.g., Anders & Caswell,
2009; Hoekman & Nicita, 2011; Tran, Wilson, & Anders,
2012; Wilson, Mann, & Otsuki, 2003), while others indicate
that standards have no impact at all on exports from develop-
ing countries (e.g., Xiong & Beghin, 2013). Another issue in
the debate is that standards could be less trade restricting if
harmonized into consistent sets of international standards
(e.g., Wilson & Otsuki, 2003; Wilson, Otsuki, & Majumdar,
2003 and Czubala, Shepherd, & Wilson, 2009). Two recent
studies conclude that the direction and magnitude of effects
are sector specific and specific for different types of standards
(Melo, Engler, Nahuehual, Cofre, & Barrena, 2014; Shepherd
& Wilson, 2013).
The empirical evidence from gravity models is very informa-
tive in the debate but needs to be complemented with firm-
level evidence to understand micro-economic effects and
within-country dynamics (Honda et al., in press, Ch. 7). The
recent international trade literature puts a lot of emphasis
on export decisions, export performance and export persis-
tence of individual firms (e.g., Bernard & Jensen, 1997;
Roberts & Tybout, 1997). Melitz (2003) seminal work intro-
duced the concept of firm heterogeneity and self-selection of
firms into exporting. Recent empirical studies confirm that
observed as well as unobserved heterogeneity in firm charac-
teristics matter to explain trade (e.g., Bernard, Jensen,
Redding, & Schott, 2007; Breinlich & Criscuolo, 2011;Helpman, Melitz, & Rubinstein, 2008). This confirms the need
for firm-level studies on trade implications of standards.
Certification to private standards may have several effects at
the micro-level. Standards reduce information asymmetries
between importers and exporters about quality and produc-
tion techniques (Darby & Karni, 1973; Nelson 1970), which
may affect firms’ economic performance in terms of market
shares, efficiency, export volumes, and values. Due to market
signaling effects, as well as gains originating from improved
internal management and operational monitoring (Graffham,
Karehu, & MacGregor, 2009), certification to standards can
increase firms’ export volumes. Compliance with standards
and certification involves fixed and variable costs that are
borne by exporters and that vary considerably across individ-
ual firms (Maskus et al., 2013). Firms will decide to become
certified if their individual expected utility of certification is
higher than the costs they have to bear to adopt a standard.
The lower the certification costs or the larger the expected firm
benefits, the higher the probability for a firm to seek certifica-
tion. Heterogeneity in firm characteristics will result in differ-
ent adoption behavior of companies, with more productive
firms self-selecting into standard compliance and certification.
This may lead to the reallocation of resources from non-
complying to complying firms (Geroski, Machin, & Van
Reenen, 1993) and a progressive market exit of less productive
firms. However, in line with industrial cluster theory, it might
well be that certification of several firms creates export benefits
for non-certified firms through spillover effects, and benefits
the whole sector in addition to the firm individual benefits
(Giuliani, Pietrobelli, & Rabellotti, 2005).
While there are some studies analyzing the impact of stan-
dards on the export performance of firms in industrialized
countries (e.g., Fontagne´, Orefice, Piermartini, & Rocha,
2013), few empirical studies explore the relations between
standards and the export performance of firms in developing
countries and even less studies specifically look at the agricul-
tural and food sector. 1 Volpe-Martincus, Castresana, and
Castagnino (2010) and Otsuki (2011) for instance investigate
the effect of one specific voluntary standard that applies to dif-
ferent sectors in developing countries and find that ISO certi-
fication respectively improves the export performance of firms
in Argentina and in Central Asia. Chen, Wilson, and Otsuki
(2008) study how public standards in different destination
markets affect developing-country firms’ export decisions,
and find that quality standards are positively correlated with
firms’ average export volume and with their export scope,
measured by the number of export markets and products.
To the best of our knowledge, there is only one study that
provides firm-level evidence on the impact of private food
standards on developing countries’ agricultural export perfor-
mance: Henson, Masakure, and Cranfield (2011) empirically
investigate the impact of GlobalGAP certification on the
export revenue of fresh produce exporters in ten African
countries and conclude that certification improves firms’
export revenues.
Our analysis builds on and extends the existing work on pri-
vate standards and trade with developing countries in four
main ways. First, with a new case study on Peruvian asparagus
export firms we contribute to the debate, and create insights
that are complementary to evidence from macro-economic
gravity models and add to the scarce literature on firm-level
trade effects of standards. Second, thanks to the size (over
100 export firms per year) and long history of the sector (data
from 1993 to 2011) we are able to keep country and sector-
specific characteristics constant. With this single sector and
country study we get rid of country and sector heterogeneities
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et al., 2011; Otsuki, 2011) and sector (Volpe-Martincus et al.,
2010) studies. Third, with a panel dataset over 18 years, rather
than a cross-section or repeated cross-section as in most previ-
ous studies, we can control for firm-specific heterogeneities
and export dynamics over time. This allows us to integrate
insights on the importance of firm heterogeneity from the
international trade literature. This is particularly important
in the analysis of the effects of private standards, as adherence
is voluntary and can depend on unobserved heterogeneity of
firms and past export performance. We also complement
previous studies by taking individual firms’ export persistence
into account. Fourth, we focus on all types of voluntary pri-
vate standards that are present in the Peruvian asparagus
export sector and are able to study effects of several individual
certification schemes. Fifth, as in Volpe-Martincus et al.
(2010) we focus on a middle-income country, where the export
sector was already established previous to the rise of private
standards and where effects could thus be different from a sec-
tor or country where the export sector developed contempora-
neously to the rise of private standards.3. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
(a) Data
We use a unique firm level dataset on Peruvian fresh aspar-
agus exports constructed from secondary sources and own ori-
ginal data collection. Secondary data include transaction-level
customs data and tax administration data on 567 asparagus
export firms for the period 1993–2011. The customs data con-
tain information on the identification of the exporter (firm
names and tax identification number), the exported volume,
the destination market, and the FOB value for all export
transactions. Since virtually the entire asparagus production
in Peru is destined for export, the data comprise the entire
industry sales. We collapsed the transaction-level data to the
yearly level and merged it with tax administration data. The
latter contain information on the foundation date of the firms,
core activities, general managers, location, branches, as well as
historical fiscal benefits or irregularities. In our dataset all
companies are considered as “exporters” from the year they
first export fresh asparagus and as long as they are registered
as an active export company with the tax administration. We
substitute zeros with missing values for export volumes and
FOB values of the companies considered as “exporters”. Tax
administration data are available for all years in which the
company is registered as being active.
We complement these secondary records with primary data
from a survey among a representative sample of export com-
panies. From the total population of 567 firms, that at least
once exported fresh asparagus during 1993–2011, we draw a
stratified random sample of 100 companies. We randomly
selected companies from three mutually exclusive strata,
according to the companies’ exporting experience in 2011: con-
solidated companies with at least 6 years of export experience
(total population of 63 companies), intermediate companies,
with between 3 and 5 years of export experience (90 compa-
nies) and start-up companies with less than 3 years of experi-
ence (416 companies). Together consolidated and
intermediate companies are responsible for 88% of the
volumes exported during 1993–2011 and are more likely to
be certified to private standards than start-up companies.
The latter often only export for a few years and then withdraw
from the export sector. For the analysis of how standardsaffect export performance, consolidated and intermediated
companies are more relevant, and, therefore, we oversample
these companies. The sample includes both companies that
were operational in 2011, the year the survey was implemented,
as well as companies that ceased operations by that year. This
sampling strategy ensures that the sample is representative not
only for the current situation but for the whole period. The sur-
vey was implemented between July and September 2011 using
an original questionnaire including recall questions on the cer-
tification to private food standards, production and processing
procedures, management structure, ownership, etc.
In the subsequent analysis, descriptive statistics are partially
drawn from secondary data, including the whole population of
567 companies, and partially from primary data, coming from
the sample of 87 2 companies and including 44 consolidated
companies, 27 intermediate companies, and 16 start-up com-
panies. In the latter case we use sampling weights that put less
weight on consolidated and intermediate companies and more
weight on start-up companies to adjust for the stratified sam-
pling design. In particular, we calculated different weights for
each year of the analysis according to the number of consoli-
dated, intermediate, and start-up companies that were present
in the entire population of export firms and the number of
firms that we had included in our sample. Regressions are
run on 84 out of the 87 surveyed companies, due to missing
values in the company covariates and on 70 companies when
lagged variables are used as instruments for current variables.
(b) Export performance
Peru is the largest exporter of fresh asparagus worldwide.
The sector currently accounts for about 25% of the country’s
total agricultural exports. More than 220,000 ton of asparagus
are produced yearly. There is no domestic market for aspara-
gus and 99% of the whole production is exported, of which
70% as fresh produce (SUNAT—customs data, 2011). The
main destination market for fresh asparagus exports are the
USA and, to a smaller extent, countries in the European
Union. The history of cultivation and export of asparagus
from Peru goes back to the 1950s, when imported seeds from
California (USA) were first planted in La Libertad region in
Northern Peru. Production and export did not expand consid-
erably until the mid 1980s, when a project funded by the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) brought the
seeds to the Ica region, located south of Lima. Following the
excellent production results obtained in Ica with USAID
assistance, other private firms—mainly with an agricultural
investment background—replicated the experience.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the total export volume and
value (Figure 1a), and the number of firms exporting each year
(Figure 1b). Asparagus exports increased tremendously in the
period 1993–2011, from 4,590 ton and 6.4 million USD in
1993 to 134,992 ton and 286 million USD in 2011 (Figure 1a).
Export growth was steady during the 1990s, accelerated in the
late 1990s, and slowed down again from 2009 onward. The
accelerated growth in the late 1990s is due to the introduction
of several new neo-liberal land policies and laws promoting
private investment in agriculture at the end of the 1990s
(Diaz, 2007; O’Brien and Diaz, 2004; Shimizu, 2006). The
growth slowdown in 2009 is likely related to increasing
USD/Peruvian Nuevo Sol exchange rate fluctuations 3 and
to overall international demand shocks, e.g., the global
economic crisis that badly impacted all Peruvian exports.
The number of firms exporting each year shows a similar trend
(Figure 1b). The number has tripled from around 40 firms at
the end of the 1990s to almost 120 firms in 2006, and stabilized
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Figure 1. Evolution of fresh asparagus exports and export firms, 1993–2011.
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of 567 firms that ever exported fresh asparagus since 1993,
these figures point to an absence of consolidation and a large
transition in and out of exporting. The overall parallel pattern
of export volumes and values in Figure 1a indicates that
export prices remained relatively stable over the entire period.
Table 1 describes the average export performance at the firm
level for 2001 and 2011. Out of all firms that ever exported
fresh asparagus, 25% were actively exporting in 2001 and
18% were actively exporting in 2011. These figures confirmTable 1. Export performance
Variables
Mean
Propensity to export (dummy) 0.25
Export volume (in ton) 167.8
Export volume (in ton)—conditional on exporting 673.72
Export value (in th. $) 233.49
Export value (in th. $)—conditional on exporting 937.45
Source: Own elaboration from SUNAT Data.the large export entry and exit transitions. The average export
volume of actively exporting firms doubled over the past dec-
ade, from 673 ton in 2001 to 1,405 ton in 2011, and the average
export value tripled, from 937 thousand USD to almost 3 mil-
lion USD (Table 1). When using unconditional export perfor-
mance indicators, i.e. when including firms that are not
actively exporting in specific years, the total export volumes
and values per firm are lower, but still increase considerably
over time. This indicates that Peruvian asparagus export firms
are growing on average and in terms of total exported goods.of firms, 2001 versus 2011
2001 2011
Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N
0.43 269 0.18 0.39 525
659.07 269 257.03 1,215.25 525
1,190.71 67 1,405.63 2,552.32 96
911.08 269 545.78 2,572.01 525
1,643.36 67 2,984.73 5,397.42 96
212 WORLD DEVELOPMENTStandard deviations of export volumes and values are large,
indicating a large variability in firms’ exports.
(c) Certification to private standards
Figure 1 also describes, for our sample, the evolution of
export volumes and values for certified and non-certified firms
(Figure 1c) and the evolution of the number of certified and
non-certified firms (Figure 1d). The certified export volume
and value increased rapidly from 2000 onward. Almost no
produce was certified until the year 2000 but by 2003 the
export volume of certified firms had already exceeded that of
non-certified firms. The volume of non-certified asparagus
decreased sharply during 2000–05, but increased slightly again
after 2005. Similarly, the spread of certification among firms
was most rapid in the early 2000s. By 2006, the number of cer-
tified firms surpassed the number of non-certified firms and
remained stable from 2007–08 onward. At the individual firm
level, this trend translates into an increased likelihood of cer-
tification; overall the share of certified companies increased
from 7.1% in 2001 to 37.8% in 2011 (Table 2).
The rapid spread of certificates in the sector is related to the
increased demand for compliance with stringent quality and
safety standards by retailers in importing countries at the turn
of the decade (Diaz, 2007). But also national initiatives have
played a role in the spread of private standards. In 1998, the
Asparagus National Technical Committee of Standardization
(ANTCS) was established in order to develop national stan-
dards that would strengthen the food quality and safety capac-
ity and to respond effectively to the requirements of importers
and of national regulatory authorities of importing
countries. 4 These national initiatives provided a quality and
performance baseline for the entire industry that allowed
many firms to generate the skills and experience needed to
become certified under various stringent international stan-
dards (Diaz, 2007).
The existing literature on standards (e.g., Henson &
Humphrey, 2010) classifies private standards according to
the vertical scope or the extension along the value chain and
subdivides them into pre-farm gate or production standards
and post-farm gate or processing standards. The formerTable 2. Certification to private fo
Certification variables (=1 if certified) Full specification
Certification General certification varia
Production standards
GlobalGAP Global Good Agricultura
SQF2000 Safe Quality Food Institu
TESCO Tesco Nurture (supermar
LEAF Linking Environment and
GAP Good Agricultural Practi
Processing standards
HACCP Hazard Analysis and Crit
BRC British Retail Consortium
GMP Good Manufacturing Pra
IFS International Food Stand
SQF1000 Safe Quality Food Institu
Other standards
BASC Business Alliance for Secu
Data from survey on stratified random sample; all sample means are weighted
and intermediate companies.regulate how farmers grow the crop and the latter oversee
the transformation of the product. Both types of standards
are important in the asparagus sector in Peru and experienced
a rapid growth during the years 2000s. While in 2001, out of
all companies in our sample, none was certified to a produc-
tion standard and only 7% were certified to a processing stan-
dard, by 2011, respectively one third and one fourth of all
companies are certified to at least one production or process-
ing standard. 5 As we can observe from Table 2, GlobalGAP is
adopted by 34% of the sampled companies and is the most
important private production standard in the sector. It was
specifically developed to raise standards in the production of
fresh fruit and vegetables and ensures a level playing field in
terms of food safety and quality. The most important process-
ing standards are HACCP and BRC, which are adopted by
respectively 14% and 15% of all firms. HACCP and BRC
are risk management systems, that apply primarily to the man-
ufacturing of food packaging and filling operations. They both
identify, evaluate, and control hazards related to food safety,
but BRC has higher requirements concerning the adoption of
a documented quality management system. Other production
standards—similar to GlobalGAP—include SQF2000, Tesco
Leaf and GAP, and other processing standards—similar to
HACCP or BRC—are GMP, IFS, and SQF1000; these are less
important in the studied sector and adopted by less than 10%
of the companies.
Private certification in the Peruvian asparagus export sector
is not perceived as a main market access issue, nor as an
important market strategy for differentiation. In an open ques-
tion included in the company survey carried out between July
and September 2011, firms were asked to report the reasons
for which they got certified to individual standards. Forty per-
cent of all companies perceive certification to production stan-
dards as being an overall requirement from the market, but
only 3% of all firms believe that production certification is a
pre-condition for exporting at all. Processing standards are
perceived to be more buyer-driven, as 60% of all companies
declare that the standards are requested by specific importers
and around 13% of the firms feel that they are indispensable
for exporting. Another 20% and 15% of all firms declare that
they respectively adopted production and processingod standards, 2001 versus 2011
Percentage of firms certified
2001 (N = 26) 2011 (N = 56)
ble 7.1 37.8
0 34.6
l Practice 0 34.6
te 2000 0 7.7
ket standard) 0 6.4
Farming 0 4.3
ce 0 2.1
7.1 25
ical Control Point 3.6 14.1
0 15.4
ctices 3.6 7.5
ard 0 2.4
te 1000 0 1.1
re Commerce 0 15.2
for the population average to control for the oversampling of consolidated
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objective to innovate their internal company structures and
of adding value to their company. In general, standards are
thus adopted to follow an overall market trend, to respond
to specific importers’ demands and hence to eventually main-
tain companies’ positions as reliable suppliers of asparagus to
international markets. Due to a partial overlap of the types of
certification schemes, companies are likely to get certified to
different standards to respond to different market demands
and without incurring very high additional costs.
(d) Export firm characteristics
Table 3 reports summary statistics on export performance
and observable firm characteristics and compares certified
and non-certified companies in 2011. Out of the 96 companies
that were exporting fresh asparagus in 2011, 56 were included
in our survey, of which 34 companies are certified to at least
one private standard, while 22 do not adhere to any certifica-
tion scheme. Firm characteristics and, in particular, firms’
export performance differ substantially by certification. The
2011 export volumes and values of certified firms areTable 3. Export performance and firm characteristics for certifie
Variables All firms C
Mean Std. Dev. N Me
Firm export performance
Export volume
2001 (^)—ton 565.7 1,481.4 96 1,38
2006 (^^)—ton 910.6 1,777.8 96 1,66
2011—ton 1,405.6 2,552.3 96 2,66
% Growth 2001–11 9.2 214.2 521 22.
Export value
2003 (^)—in th. $ 835.7 2,223.3 96 3,45
2006 (^^)—in th. $ 1,688.0 3,745.3 96 4,74
2011—in th. $ 2,984.7 5,397.4 96 5,72
% Growth 2001–11 5 85.6 521 8.9
Firm characteristics
Asparagus land (dummy) 0.53 0.50 50 0.9
Asparagus land (Ha) 20.24 45.31 50 52.8
Processing plant 0.49 0.50 57 0.8
Years exist 8.02 6.37 96 13.1
years exporting 6.58 5.65 96 10.5
Pioneerb 0.24 0.43 62 0.5
Foreign capital 0.40 0.49 57 0.4
Green asparagus 94.46 20.49 59 86.3
Administrative staff change 0.08 0.28 96 0.0
Organizational change 0.03 0.18 56 0.0
Double tax ID 0.02 0.14 96 0.0
Taxpayer “Good” 0.03 0.18 96 0.0
Number of production quartersb 1.49 2.56 96 2.8
Administrative quartersb 0.21 0.63 96 0.4
Non-agricultural capitalb 0.23 0.43 96 0.3
Ancashb 0.02 0.14 56 0.0
Icab 0.59 0.50 56 0.6
La Libertadb 0.30 0.46 56 0.2
Limab 0.08 0.27 58 0.0
All sample means are weighted for the population average to control for the o
companies that are exporting in 2011 and in 2001: N = 25, of which ‘certified
that were exporting in 2011 and in 2006: N = 37, of which ‘certified comp’.: N
a t-Tests *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively
b Time constant variables.significantly and on average almost three times higher than
those of non-certified firms. Yet, already in 2003 6 and 2006
before becoming certified, these companies had significantly
larger exports. This indicates that certified firms perform bet-
ter in the export market but that they already did so before
being certified. The export volumes of currently certified firms
grew significantly faster during the past decade than the
exports of non-certified firms, with a yearly average relative
growth of around 23% compared to around 6% for non-certi-
fied firms. Yet, differences are less pronounced for the relative
growth of export values and differences are not statistically sig-
nificant. Certified firms grew faster than non-certified firms in
terms of the quantity exported, but not necessarily in terms of
export value.
Certified and non-certified firms differ substantially in terms
of observable characteristics. Out of all firms, 53% own agri-
cultural land and 49% own a processing plant, but certified
firms are more likely to own both agricultural land (96%)
and a processing plant (85%) than non-certified firms (32%
and 28% respectively). The average landholdings are substan-
tially larger for certified firms (52.86 ha) than for non-certified
firms (3.6 ha). On average in 2011, asparagus export firmsd and non-certified firms that are actively exporting in 2011
ertified firms
(N = 34)
Non certified firms
(N = 22)
Comparison of means a
an Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
7.0 2,345.3 191.2 677.7 *
3.4 4,327.1 46.5 227.8 *
4.2 4,032.3 828.1 1,221.6 **
9 355.26 6.1 21.3 *
0.9 3,313 1,276 1,205.0 *
9.8 5,718.4 1,531.5 1,705.2 *
1.9 8,408 1,672 2,507.3 **
135.3 3.4 17.8
6 0.25 0.32 0.38 **
6 86.33 3.63 6.57 ***
5 0.46 0.28 0.36 **
1 6.06 4.99 3.05 **
2 6.47 3.63 2.76 *
9 0.63 0.05 0.18 *
4 0.64 0.38 0.39
1 39.72 99.04 5.22
3 0.21 0.12 0.26
3 0.21 0.03 0.15
3 0.21 0.00 0.00
6 0.30 0.12 0.26
8 4.26 0.30 0.50 ***
9 1.20 0.00 0.00 ***
3 0.60 0.18 0.31 **
6 0.30 0.00 0.00
4 0.61 0.56 0.40
5 0.55 0.33 0.38
3 0.21 0.12 0.26
versampling of consolidated and intermediate companies; (^) Number of
comp’.: N = 21, ‘Non certified comp’.: N = 4; (^^) Number of companies
= 28, ‘Non certified comp’.: N = 9.
.
214 WORLD DEVELOPMENTexisted for more than 8 years and had almost 7 years of export
experience. Certified firms are significantly older (13 years)
and have significantly more years of export experience
(10 years) than non-certified firms (5 and 4 years), which
could indicate that there is less entry and exit among certified
firms. Indeed, 59% of the currently certified firms are pioneers
who were already in the market before 2003 while this is barely
5% for non-certified firms. Out of all firms, 40% rely on foreign
capital; this is slightly but not significantly larger among certi-
fied firms (44%) than among non-certified firms (38%). The
large majority of all firms grows green asparagus (94% of all
firms) and the cultivation of white asparagus is concentrated
in the hands of few large, mostly certified, export companies
in northern Peru. During their lifespan companies experience
administrative and organizational changes, but these are rela-
tively rare (respectively around 8% and 3% of all companies)
and are not more frequent in certified or non-certified compa-
nies. Exports under two different tax identifiers, the classifica-
tion as being a good taxpayer and the location of certified and
non-certified firms differs slightly but not significantly.
Significant differences are observed in the company’s number
of production quarters, administrative offices, and origin of
the starting capital, which are all variables related to the size
of a company.4. ECONOMETRIC APPROACH
To assess whether the observed differences in export perfor-
mance between certified and non-certified firms are due to the
causal impact of certification we estimate the following regres-
sion model:
Exportit ¼ b0 þ b1Cit þ b2X it þ Dt þ vit ð1Þ
To estimate effects at the intensive and extensive margin of
trade, the dependent variable Exportit is specified in five differ-
ent ways: 1, as a dummy variable equaling one if firm i is export-
ing in year t; 2 and 3, as the logarithm of the export volume (2)
or the export value (3) of firm i in year t, being positive when the
firm exports or zero when the firm does not export in year t; 4
and 5, as the logarithm of the export volume (4) or the export
value (5) of firm i in year t, conditional on exporting in that year.
The key variable of interest in the model is the variable for
certification of firm i in year t, Cit. This is a dummy variable
equaling one if firm i is certified to any type of standards, to
a production or processing standard, or to a particular indi-
vidual standard (including GlobalGAP, HACCP, BRC and
BASC—to which at least 15% of all companies are certified
in 2011). When looking at production, processing, and indi-
vidual standards, we reduce our sample of firms according
to the applicability of the type of certification. Only firms cul-
tivating land are kept when analyzing the effect of production
certifications, while only firms that are (also) processing their
own products are included in the analysis on processing certi-
fications. The BASC certification is relevant for all types of
firms, cultivating and/or processing the export product and
the full sample is thus used for the analysis.
The vector Xit is a large set of observable firm characteristics
related to the type and size of the firm, experience, access to
foreign capital, tax pay regime, management changes, and
location—these variables 7 are described in Table 3. Year
dummies Dt are included to control for common macro-
economic effects and vit is the error term.
The main difficulty in estimating Eqn. (1) and identifying the
causal impact of certification to private standards Cit on firms’
export performance Exportit is that the voluntary certificationdecision of firms is potentially endogenous. The endogeneity
could be due to 1, potential reverse causality, i.e., certification
decisions might be determined by current export performance;
2, certification being predetermined, i.e., certification might
depend on past export performance, which also affects current
exports; 3, time-constant unobserved heterogeneity, i.e., time-
constant unobserved factors being contemporaneously corre-
lated with exports and certification; or 4, time-varying unob-
served heterogeneity, i.e., lagged dynamic unobserved factors
affecting certification and having a persistent effect on export
performance. The recent empirical trade literature has shown
that export persistence and unobserved firm heterogeneity are
important in explaining export performance. Failing to control
for past export behavior and unobservable characteristics
would likely lead to an overestimation of the impact of certifi-
cation on export performance. We use several estimation
techniques to control for dynamic and unobserved effects. 8
First, we ignore firm-specific unobserved effects and the
dynamic export pattern and estimate Eqn. (1) using OLS. 9
We expect that, due to past exports and unobserved factors
being positively (negatively) correlated with certification and
with current exports, OLS is leading to an upward bias in esti-
mating the effect of certification on export performance.
Second, we account for export persistence over time by
including a one-year lag of the respective dependent variable
Exporti,t1 in the model, as specified in Eqn. (2). Since past
export performance is likely positively correlated with the cur-
rent certification decision andwith current export performance,
we expect the bias on the certification variable to decrease.
Exportit ¼ b0 þ b1Cit þ b2X it þ b3Exporti;t1 þ Dt þ vit ð2Þ
Third, we explicitly consider the role of unobserved firm
heterogeneity and re-specify the equation by decomposing
the error term vit in a time-constant ei and a time-varying com-
ponent uit. Eqn. (3) specifies a fixed effects model in which
time-constant unobserved heterogeneity ei can be eliminated.
We estimate the model using the standard within (fixed effects)
estimator.
Exportit ¼ b0 þ b1Cit þ b2X it þ b3Exporti;t1 þ Dt þ uit þ ei
ð3Þ
With this strategy we can control for time-constant
unobserved heterogeneity but a problem remains (Nickell,
1981). Lagged export performance Exporti,t1 is not strictly
exogenous, which could lead to a downward bias in the esti-
mated coefficient b3 (Bond, 2002). Also certification Cit is
likely not strictly exogenous and if a positive (negative) shock
to past export performance positively (negatively) affects the
likelihood of certification, the standard fixed effects estimator
would lead to a downward (upward) bias in the estimated cer-
tification coefficient b1 (Bond, 2002). Therefore, we expect the
fixed effects estimator to result in a downward bias of the esti-
mated effect of certification on export performance.
Fourth, to deal with this remaining problem we estimate the
model using the System General Method of Moments (System
GMM) approach (Arellano & Bond, 1991). This method com-
bines first difference transformation to eliminate time-constant
unobserved heterogeneity ei with an instrumental variable esti-
mation to further reduce remaining endogeneity bias. Lagged
levels of the explanatory variables and further lags of the
dependent variable are used as instruments in the first-
difference equation while lagged first-differences of these
variables 10 are used as instruments in the levels equa-
tions, and the moment conditions of the first difference and
the levels equations are combined in the System GMM
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Bond, 1998; Bond, 2002). For the choice of the instruments it
is important to ascertain whether the explanatory variables are
strictly exogenous (independent), predetermined (depending
on past exports), or simultaneously endogenous (depending
on current exports). We treat the time dummies Dt as exoge-
nous, certification Cit as endogeneous
11 and all but one firm
characteristics Xit as predetermined. The variable ‘asparagus
land’ is also treated as endogenous because land can be con-
verted to other crops or rented out rather quickly in response
to export shocks, while adaptation of other firm characteristics
to changes in the export performance is not immediate. Prede-
termined variables are instrumented with three lags in the dif-
ference equation and with their difference lagged once in the
levels equation. For the endogenous variables the number of
instruments is reduced by one, as only lags two and up are
valid. All instruments are collapsed in order to limit the instru-
ment count (Roodman, 2009). The validity of all instruments
and the additional moment conditions from the equation in
levels are tested respectively with the Hansen test of over-iden-
tification restrictions and the Hansen difference test. We
believe that the System GMM estimator gives the most correct
estimates with the smallest bias.
Fifth, we use the same System GMM estimator as above but
extend the lagged instruments by one level in the difference
equation. This comes down to instrumenting all first
differenced predetermined variables with their levels from
one to four inclusive and the endogenous variables from two
to four inclusive; in the levels equation the number of instru-
ments does not change. To the extent that this specification
of the system GMM estimator introduces more information,
it should improve efficiency, and at the same time test theTable 4. Certification to any private stan
Coefficients for certification (=1
Dep Var
OLS
(1)
Export dummy 0.209***
(0.071)
N = 785
Export volumes (ton) 2.871***
(1.024)
N = 785
Export values (th $) 3.046***
(1.072)
N = 785
Export volumes (ton), conditional on exporting 0.407
(0.475)
N = 499
Export values (th $), conditional on exporting 0.424
(0.460)
N = 499
Time trend No
Year and location dummies Yes
Covariates Yes
Company cluster robust standard errors in parenthesis for the OLS and FE e
2005) in parenthesis for the System GMM; Column 4 shows SYS-GMM result
with up to four lags of instruments;. The tests for second-order autocorrelation
are not reported in columns 4 and 5 but all accepted at above the 10% signifi
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.robustness of the results to an alternative set of instruments
(Roodman, 2007; Roodman, 2009).
With the GMM strategy we are able to eliminate endoge-
neity problems arising from reverse causality, predetermined
dependence on past performance and time-constant unob-
served heterogeneities. The problem of endogeneity arising
from lagged omitted variables with persistent impacts on
export performance is not fully addressed, but we deem
remaining bias to be limited as lagged dependent variables,
dummy variables for management and organizational
changes, and a wide set of other observable variables likely
capture a large part of the time-varying characteristics. 12
Moreover, the GMM method shows that results are robust
to the extension or reduction of lagged right hand side
instruments; results thus do not depend on a specific lagged
certification being correlated with a year-specific omitted
variable. A final problem arises when considering the
conditional export volumes and values as dependent
variables. If unobservable firm characteristics affect both
firms’ decision to export and the quantity exported, there
is an additional selection bias problem. This would lead to
additional bias especially in the OLS estimation but is also
(partially) controlled for in the fixed effects and System
GMM estimation.5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
(a) Impact of certification on export performance
Table 4 reports regression results for the main variable of
interest, certification to private standards. Results are reporteddard and firms’ export performance
if certified; =0 not certified)
Model
OLS FE Sys-GMM Sys-GMM
(2) (3) (4) (5)
0.101** 0.113 0.089 0.093
(0.044) (0.071) (0.079) (0.073)
N = 713 N = 713 N = 713 N = 713
0.953* 0.693 0.706 0.688
(0.510) (0.723) (0.759) (0.692)
N = 713 N = 713 N = 713 N = 713
1.030* 0.785 0.735 0.694
(0.534) (0.757) (0.793) (0.727)
N = 713 N = 713 N = 713 N = 713
0.109 0.701 0.404 0.451
(0.382) (0.428) (0.788) (0.752)
N = 468 N = 468 N = 468 N = 468
0.131 0.66 0.364 0.41
(0.374) (0.403) (0.815) (0.780)
N = 468 N = 468 N = 468 N = 468
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
stimations. Robust finite samples corrected standard errors (Windmeijer,
s with up to three lags of instruments; Column 5 shows SYS-GMM results
, Hansen-test for overidentification restrictions and Difference Hanson test
cance level.
216 WORLD DEVELOPMENTfor the different export performance indicators—an export
dummy variable and conditional and unconditional export
volumes and values—and for different estimation methods—
OLS without lagged exports (Model 1), OLS with lagged
exports (Model 2), fixed effects (Model 3), system GMM with
up to three period lags as instruments (Model 4), and system
GMM with up to four period lags as instruments (Model 5).
In all regressions we control for observable covariates, time
and location dummies.
Our main result is that, when controlling for export persis-
tence, unobserved heterogeneity and reverse causality, we do
not find any evidence that certification has a significant impact
on companies’ export performance, neither at the extensive
margin nor at the intensive margin, and neither on export vol-
umes nor on export values. We find a significant positive effect
of certification on the export dummy and the unconditional
export volumes and values when using an OLS estimation with-
out controlling for export persistence (Model 1). The effect
reduces sharply but remains significant when time trends are
controlled for (Model 2) and becomes completely insignificant
in the fixed effects (Model 3) and System GMM (Models 4 and
5) estimation. The estimated effects from the OLS regression
without time trends are two to four times larger than the esti-
mated effects in the otherModels. This is in line with our expec-
tations that OLS without lagged dependent variable
overestimates the effect because of a positive correlation
between past export performance and certification, because of
unobserved firm characteristics being contemporaneously cor-
related with certification and export performance, and because
of reverse causality. We believe the System GMM estimationsTable 5. Certification to specific private
Independent variable—main certification sc
Dep Var
Production standards
Any type of
production standard
GlobalGAP
(1) (2)
Export dummy 0.064 0.061
(0.065) (0.065)
N = 326 N = 325
Export volumes (ton) 0.39 0.35
(0.721) (0.720)
N = 326 N = 325
Export values (th $) 0.381 0.338
(0.766) (0.763)
N = 326 N = 325
Export volumes (ton), conditional
on exporting
0.374 0.307
(0.504) (0.492)
N = 275 N = 275
Export values (th $), conditional
on exporting
0.35 0.279
(0.534) (0.518)
N = 275 N = 275
Year dummies Yes Yes
Covariates Yes Yes
Sample If cultivated land > 0
Columns show SYS-GMM results with up to three lags of instruments. Robust
for the System GMM; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. The tests for second
Difference Hanson test are not reported but all accepted at above the 10% sigare the most correct ones with the smallest bias in the estimated
coefficients.
When estimating the impact of certification on export vol-
umes and values conditional on exporting in year t, we find
no significant effect at all in any of the models. The estimated
coefficients for the certification variable are substantially lower
when considering conditional export volumes and values than
when considering unconditional export volumes and values.
This is most apparent in the OLS models where we do find
a significant effect on the probability of exporting and on
unconditional export volumes and values but not on condi-
tional export volumes and values. This implies that certifica-
tion is more correlated with the likelihood of exporting, i.e.
the extensive margin than with the intensity of exporting, i.e.
the intensive margin. Also the reduced sample size—stemming
from the fact that companies do not export in all years—may
result in larger standard errors of the estimates and a lack of
significant effects in the OLS models.
In order to account for eventual heterogeneous effects, in
Table 5 we split up the analysis and run the models separately
for production standards, processing standards and the most
common individual standards. Again different export perfor-
mance indicators are used and observable covariates, time,
and location dummies are controlled for. The analysis is
now restricted to different subgroups of our dataset, according
to the applicability of the type of certification. In columns 1
and 2 of Table 5, we only look at firms cultivating land and
for which production certifications are applicable, while in col-
umns 3–5 we only look at firms that are (also) processing their
own products and for which processing certifications arestandards and export performance
hemes (=1 if certified; =0 not certified)
Certification
Processing standards Other type of standard
Any type of
processing standard
HACCP BRC BASC
(3) (4) (5) (6)
0.038 0.007 0.084 0.002
(0.049) (0.051) (0.078) (0.084)
N = 388 N = 388 N = 388 N = 696
0.097 0.578 0.943 0.358
(0.587) (0.570) (0.804) (0.891)
N = 388 N = 388 N = 388 N = 696
0.155 0.65 1.014 0.338
(0.620) (0.605) (0.855) (0.915)
N = 388 N = 388 N = 388 N = 696
0.801 0.377 0.905 1.126
(0.625) (1.059) (1.285) (0.908)
N = 298 N = 298 N = 298 N = 457
0.842 0.384 0.806 1.068
(0.649) (1.223) (1.474) (0.980)
N = 298 N = 298 N = 298 N = 457
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
If firm owns a processing plant Full sample
finite samples corrected standard errors (Windmeijer, 2005) in parenthesis
-order autocorrelation, Hansen-test for overidentification restrictions and
nificance level.
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firms and the full sample is used in column 6. Only results
from the System GMM Model are reported, as this gives the
most credible estimates with the smallest bias. The outcomes
from Table 5 show that different types of private certification
schemes, referring to either production or processing
standards, have a similar non-significant effect on firms’ export
performance. The results corroborate the findings above that,
when controlling for export persistence, unobserved effects
and reverse causality, we do not find evidence that individual
private standards improve firms’ export performance, neither
at the extensive margin nor at the intensive margin. Results
from regressions on individual standards show smaller coeffi-
cients and standard errors, as compared to the more general
regressions in Table 4, which supports our conclusion that
there is no evidence of an effect of any type of certification
on export performance.
Our result that certification to private standards does not
improve firms’ export performance challenges the “standards-
as-catalyst” view and previous firm-level evidence on export-
enhancing effects of private standards, provided by Henson
et al. (2011) and Volpe-Martincus et al. (2010). Explanations
for these diverging findings are likely to relate to the nature
of the specific case that is studied and to differences in method-
ology. Peru already had a long tradition of asparagus exports
before private standards started to become important in inter-
national markets at the start of the 2000s. This long history and
the initiatives undertaken at the national level (see Section 3),
might limit the cost of compliance with stringent standards as
firms already have the skills and experience needed for such
compliance. In this context, also the benefits of certification
might be limited if standards do not substantially change pro-
duction and management practices in the industry and certifi-
cates do not enforce anything companies had not already
implemented before. Variations in destination market for spe-
cific food exports may likewise play a role in explaining differ-
ences in findings. In addition and in line with the theory of
industrial clustering and cross-firm externalities (Cadot,
Iacovone, Pierola, & Rauch, 2013; Giuliani et al., 2005), posi-
tive performance spill-over effects from certified to non-certified
companies might have played a role in the development of the
entire asparagus export industry in the past decade.
We believe that methodological differences also largely
contribute to explaining the contradicting findings between
our study and previous firm-level studies We find large differ-
ences between OLS estimates and estimates from FE and sys-
tem GMMmethods, which indicates that failure to control for
export persistence and for time-constant unobserved heteroge-
neity, as was the case in previous studies, might lead to an
overestimation of the impact of private standards.
(b) Full regression results
We report the full regression results for the preferred System
GMM estimation in Table 6. 13 First, we find that the null
hypotheses of no second-order autocorrelation of residuals,
of the joint validity of all instruments (Hansen test) and of
the joint validity of the additional instruments used in the
System GMM estimation (Difference Hansen test) cannot be
rejected at the 5% or 10% significance level. This confirms
the validity of the instruments used.
Second, we find that other firm characteristics have an
impact on export performance as well. Lagged exports have
a significant and large positive effect on current exports, which
is an indication of the expected export persistence. This effect
is consistent for the different export performance indicatorsand the magnitude of the effect is similar to that reported by
other authors (e.g., Bernard & Jensen, 2004). Further, we find
that ownership of a processing plant and of more agricultural
land do not significantly affect firms’ propensity to export but
do have a significant positive—and for land a decreasing—
effect on the export volume and value. This implies that larger
and established processing and production firms perform bet-
ter in the export market but are not necessarily more likely to
be in the market in specific years. This might indicate that
fixed investment costs affect firms’ export performance, but
cannot avoid entry and exit behavior. The age of a firm has
a u-shaped effect and export experience an inverse u-shaped
effect on export performance, with turning points around 13
and 9 years respectively. The negative and decreasing effect
of age could be related to issues such as idleness or lower
adaptability. Finally, having multiple tax identifiers and a
status as good taxpayer positively affect firms’ total export
volume and value and the likelihood of exporting but not
the conditional export volume and value. Facing a lower
tax burden—either artificially because firms split up and pay
taxes on two small, instead of one large firm or because
they are classified as reliable entities by the national tax
authority—has a positive effect on firms’ exports at the
extensive margin.6. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
In this paper we have analyzed the firm-level trade effects of
certification to private standards in the fresh asparagus export
sector in Peru. When controlling for export persistence, time-
constant unobserved heterogeneity and reverse causality, we
do not find any evidence that certification to private standards
in general and to specific individual private standards, has an
effect on firms’ export performance, neither at the extensive
margin nor at the intensive margin, and neither on export vol-
umes nor on export values. Our results indicate that exports
are sticky and that unobserved firm characteristics (e.g., entre-
preneurial ability, openness toward innovations, personal
links with importers) play an essential role in determining both
export performance and certification decisions. Our results
imply that private standards do not enhance trade; which does
not necessarily mean that they impede trade either.
These results are in line with the recent trade literature
highlighting the importance of firm characteristics in under-
standing export performance, but are different from earlier
empirical findings on the firm-level trade effect of private
food standards. In comparison with previous cross-sectional
studies, we believe that we have made methodological
improvements that resulted in more correct estimates of the
impact of private standards on firms’ export performance.
Our results show that controlling for export persistence,
reverse causality and time-constant unobserved heterogeneity
is important as it leads to very different findings on the
impact of private standards. In addition, the trade effect of
voluntary standards might be highly sector specific
(Shepherd & Wilson, 2013). Peru is a middle-income country
that had a well-established asparagus export sector with
established buyer–seller relations and relatively high safety
and quality standards, even before private standards started
to spread. Previous studies, particularly the paper by
Henson et al. (2011) on the impact of GlobalGAP certifica-
tion on horticultural exports from Africa, look at emerging
export sectors in low-income countries. The study by
Volpe-Martincus et al. (2010) looks at a middle-income
country, but merges all types of industries, where the
Table 6. Regressions on firms’ export performance—results from System GMM
Ind Var Dep Var
Export
Dummy
Export
Volume
Export
Value
Export
Volume, conditional
on exporting
Export Value,
conditional on
exporting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Certification dummy 0.093 0.688 0.694 0.451 0.41
(0.073) (0.692) (0.727) (0.752) (0.780)
Export dummy (t  1) 0.406***
(0.077)
Export volumes (t  1) 0.576*** 0.075***
(0.062) (0.029)
Export values (t  1) 0.583*** 0.066**
(0.062) (0.030)
Processing plant 0.126 2.298*** 2.398*** 0.795* 0.887*
(0.077) (0.875) (0.899) (0.399) (0.486)
Asparagus landa 0.004 0.066*** 0.067** 0.052*** 0.049***
(0.003) (0.026) (0.027) (0.016) (0.017)
Asparagus land2a 0.000* 0.000** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000**
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Years exist 0.132*** 1.376*** 1.427*** 0.890*** 0.911***
(0.026) (0.269) (0.281) (0.262) (0.263)
Years exist2 0.005*** 0.053*** 0.055*** 0.033*** 0.035***
(0.001) (0.014) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012)
Years exporting 0.077*** 0.596*** 0.608*** 0.730*** 0.748***
(0.022) (0.203) (0.213) (0.236) (0.245)
Years exporting2 0.004*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.029*** 0.031***
(0.001) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Green asparagus (%) 0.005 0.015 0.02 0.015 0.025
(0.004) (0.034) (0.036) (0.021) (0.022)
Double tax ID 0.126** 1.224** 1.281** 0.02 0.029
(0.057) (0.593) (0.620) (0.281) (0.278)
Organizational Change 0.084 1.559 1.618 0.521 0.608
(0.087) (1.043) (1.060) (0.385) (0.382)
Admin staff change 0.016 0.26 0.244 0.055 0.054
(0.058) (0.714) (0.759) (0.244) (0.241)
Foreign capital 0.109 1.047 1.141 0.038 0.05
(0.192) (1.694) (1.801) (1.038) (1.018)
Taxpayer “good” 0.281*** 2.700** 2.889** 0.59 0.756
(0.108) (1.150) (1.238) (0.669) (0.631)
Constant 0.990*** 6.387* 7.047** 13.252*** 15.001***
(0.361) (3.288) (3.419) (2.173) (2.235)
Year and location dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 713 713 713 468 468
Number of collapsed IV’s 76 76 76 76 76
Second-order autocorrelation 0.095 0.17 0.217 0.158 0.149
Hansen test: overidentification restrictions (p-value) 0.32 0.425 0.394 0.567 0.652
Diff Hansen test (p-value) 0.785 0.604 0.633 0.524 0.459
SYS-GMM results with up to three lags of instruments; Robust finite samples corrected standard errors (Windmeijer, 2005) in parenthesis; ***p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05, *p < 0.1; a divided by 10 hectares.
218 WORLD DEVELOPMENTestablishment of specific national standards previous to the
spread of the ISO standards they analyze is less clear. In such
settings the signaling role of certification is possibly more
important and private standards might be essential to convey
reliable information to importers on the features of the, to
them unknown, products and production processes. In the
Peruvian asparagus industry, the signaling role of standards
is less relevant because of already existing trading relations
and lower information asymmetries. It might well be that
in other contexts private standards have a more important
impact. This could be the case in less established export sec-
tors, such as in Africa where fresh horticultural exports
developed more recently (Maertens, Minten, & Swinnen,
2012), in less targeted export industries, where lessimportance is given to national safety and quality initiatives,
or in low-income countries where implicit norms differ
strongly from international standards.
Our analysis on the effect of certification to private standards
on firms’ export performance entails particular shortcomings.
First, we only look at the direct effect of private standards on
exports. Yet, spillover effects might be important as well and
require a different approach to be addressed. As a market
signaling tool, certification might not only affect the export per-
formance of certified firms but also those of other non-certified
firms. We find that there is no straightforward benefit for
certified firms, but from our analysis we cannot say anything
about the impact of certification on the entire industry sales
through indirect effects. Again, the importance of such an
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and likely differs for emerging and well-established export sec-
tors. Second, due to data limitations, we distinguished between
effects at the intensive and extensive margin in a rather rough
way. We only looked at whether certification changes firms’
propensity to export but there might be diverging effects on
exports to differentmarkets as the adoption of private standards
likely differs across destinationmarkets. Also, private standards
might lead to changes in destination markets. We believe that
these issues are important to address in future research on the
trade implications of private standards.
Although our findings are specific for our case-study on
asparagus exports from Peru, and we should be careful to gen-
eralize results, our study entails some important policy implica-
tions. While the scientific debate on standards-as-catalysts
versus standard-as-barriers to trade persists with mixed argu-
ments and evidence, the policy discourse has largely adopted
the view that private standards enhance developing countries’
export performance. Our results cast doubt on the view thatprivate standards act as a catalyst to trade and improve devel-
oping countries’ export performance. This has implications for
ongoing investments of NGOs and development agencies to
support developing country exporters to comply with private
standards and seek certification. 14 Our results that private
standards do not increase firms export volumes and values
imply that the return to such development programs, especially
in middle-income countries and in well-established export sec-
tors, is questionable.
We urge for more research on how private standards, and
food standards in general, affect the export opportunities of
low- and middle-income countries. In particular, we see scope
for more comparative studies, in which either—as in our
research—different types of certification schemes are analyzed
in one country and sector, or the effects of one specific stan-
dard are compared across countries and sectors. Such kind
of comparative evidence is important to fully understand the
complex interactions between standards and trade, and to
come to more generally valid conclusions.NOTES1. The literature on food standards in developing countries focuses on
how standards change the organization of supply chains (e.g., Dolan &
Humphrey, 2000; Gibbon & Ponte, 2005) and on the welfare effects for
farmers and workers (e.g., Asfaw, Mitho¨fer, & Waibel, 2010; Colen,
Maertens, & Swinnen, 2012; Ehlert, Mitho¨fer, & Waibel, 2014; Hansen &
Trifkovic´, 2014; Kersting & Wollni, 2012; Kleemann, Abdulai, & Buss,
2014; Maertens & Swinnen, 2009; Schuster & Maertens, 2013; Subervie &
Vagneron, 2013).
2. Due to field logistics six of the 100 sampled companies could not be
interviewed, while seven surveyed companies only exceptionally export
fresh asparagus and are therefore dropped from the sample.3. The USD was historically weak as compared to the Peruvian Nuevo
Sol at the end of 2007, beginning of 2008.4. A National Technical Standard—NTP 209.401, dealing with hygiene
practices for fresh asparagus handling was published in 2001, while NTP
209.402 dealing with Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) in asparagus was
published in 2003 (Diaz, 2007).5. Please notice that until 2011, the last year of our panel dataset,
environmental and labor standards did not play a very relevant role in the
entire export industry. Since then they have started to gain importance in
the market of private certifications in Peru, but in this study we are
considering standards focusing mainly on food quality and safety instead
of environmental and social issues.6. We report the export figure for 2003 instead of for 2001 as no
company in our sample that is not certified in 2011 was already exporting
in 2001.7. The number of variables slightly varies over the models, as time
constant variables are only included in the cross-sectional model speci-
fication (simple OLS).8. We do not recur to a “matching difference in difference” approach, as
used by Henson et al. (2011) and Volpe-Martincus et al. (2010), since firms
seek certification to standards in different moments between the year 2000
and 2011. The timing of certification is thus intrinsically endogenous and
the long panel data dimension of our data allows us to use better methods.
9. Although the dependent variable can be binary (when considering the
export dummy) or exhibit a probability mass at zero (when considering
unconditional export volumes or values), we use a linear method. We do
so in order to compare results with alternative estimations. Moreover, it
has been shown that linear models perform as well as more complex non-
linear estimation strategies with unobservable characteristics (Bernard &
Jensen, 2004). Results from probit and tobit estimations are not reported
but are very similar to the reported OLS results.
10. As proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) the two moment
conditions are combined and the lagged first-differences of the
explanatory and the dependent variable are used as additional
instruments to circumvent the problem that with persistent time series,
the lagged levels of the explanatory and dependent variable might be weak
predictors of endogenous changes (Blundell & Bond, 1998).
11. We also estimated the System GMM model with certification as
predetermined variable. These results are not reported but are very similar to
the reported SystemGMM results with certification as endogenous variable.
12. Despite the large information on firm characteristics, the causal effect of
certification would still be overestimated if certified companies are system-
atically better than noncertified companies along specific dimensions which
are not properly controlled for in the analysis. Sucha potential remainingbias
resulting in overestimation does not really change our conclusion.
13. The full regression results for the OLS and fixed effects models are
very similar but are not reported in order to avoid lengthy tables.
14. Initiatives such as the Pesticide Initiative Program in ACP countries
(Jaud & Cadot, 2012) and MCA or BAMEX in Madagascar (Bignebat &
Vagneron, 2011; Subervie & Vagneron, 2013).
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